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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
LYDIA G. IVIE,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
-vs.DENNIS WARING
RICHARDSON,
Defendant a,nd Appellant.

Case
No. 8856

STATEMENT OF FACTS
We cannot agree that the facts are as set forth in
appellant's brief. The plaintiff-respondent, carrying a
bag of groceries and in the company of her niece, a child,
walked north on 3rd East Street and down the edge of
the driveway to a point which plaintiff indicated on Exhibit 1 and which is marked with an "X" in ink. (See
R. 10 and Ex. 1) An examination of Exhibits 1, 3, and 4,
will clearly show that at the edge of the driveway is a
curbing and the plaintiff was standing upon the curbing
at the edge of the driveway. The fact that plaintiff on
cross-examination termed this curb area part of the drive1
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way does not alter the fact that it is not such as a matter of fact. (See R. 30, 32) The witness clarified her previous answer on cross-examination by specifically showing that the area she was in was not on the driveway:
''REDIRECT EXAMINATION

''By MR.

HYDE:

Q.

Counsel makes somewhat a play on words,
Mrs. Ivie, about what is driveway and what
isn't driveway. There is an area south of here
and north of here that the vehicles do not
drive upon, isn't that true~

A.

Yes, it is.

Q.

And were you down beyond the area where
the vehicles ordinarily drive~

A.

Yes.

Q.

That is all.
''RECROSS Ex.<\_~IIX ATION

"By

MR.

BERTOCH:

Q.

You say vehicles don't driYe on this area, :Jirs.
Ivie1

1\.

Not normally in that area.

Q.

Well this Yehicle drove on

A.

Yes.

it~

''REDIRECT EXA::\IIN"" ATION

'~By

JlH. I-I YDE:

Q.

This YPhicle \\Tnsn 't driving normally was it,
l\1rs. I Yie 't

.A..

No.
'' 1\Iu.

BERTOCH:

No further questions.
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"MR. HYDE: No further questions." (R. 35,
lines 1-23)
The defendant backed out of the garage and while reaching for his sun glasses the car veered south to the point
where the plaintiff and her niece were standing, knocking
her to the ground. (R. 10, 30)
The jury found the facts in favor of the plaintiff
and returned a verdict in favor of the plaintiff and
against the defendant. The defendant appeals upon the
grounds that the plaintiff was negligent as
matter of
law and that in any event the Court committed error in
its instructions to the jury. Since no appeal is taken on
the issue of the amount of damages awarded I shall not
reply to defendant's suggestion that her injuries did
not warrant the award granted by the jury.

a

STATEMENT OF POINTS
PoiNT I
ON APPEAL FROM A FINDING AGAINST THE
APPELLANT THE EVIDENCE· MUST BE CO,NSTR.UED MOST FAVORABLY TO THE RESPONDENT AND AGAINST THE APPELLANT.
PoiNT II
THE PLAINTIFF WAS NOT CONTRIBUTO·RILY
NEGLIGENT.
a) The plaintiff violated no statute which
w·ould bar recovery as a matter of law·.
b) The question. of n.e gligence in this case was
a, question /or the jury.

3
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PoiNT

III

NO PREJUDICIAL ERROR WAS COMMITTED
BY THE COURT IN INSTRUCTING THE JURY.

ARGUMENT
PoiNT

I

ON APPEAL FROM A FINDING AGAINST THE
APPELLANT THE EVIDENCE MUST BE CO·NSTRUED MOST FAVORABLY TO THE RESPONDENT AND AGAINST THE APPELLANT.
It is well settled law that on an appeal from an adverse verdict the Court must presume that the jury construed the testimony and resolved all conflicts in the
evidence in favor of the respondent and in reviewing the
jury's finding must construe the evidence most favorably
to the respondent and against the appellant, and plaintiffrespondent is entitled to every reasonable inference to
be drawn from the evidence. Ware v. "}l elson, 88 N.W.
524; Si1npson v. Hillnun1, 97 P. 2d 527: Tho1npson '·
Fiorito, 9 P. 2d 989; Lord Y. Western [Tn·iou, 74 P. 2d 220.
PoiNT

II

THE PLAINTIFF WAS NOT CONTRIBUTORILY
NEGLIGENT.
a) The plaintiff riolated no statute which

u·ou1d bar reco'l'e'ry as a nlafter of laze.
The statutes cited by the appellant haYe no application to the facts of this ense. The appellant complains
that the Court did not giYe consideration to his contenSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

tion that the spot upon which the respondent stood was
part of the public roadway. The respondent offered no
evidence to prove or tend to prove that the spot upon
which respondent stood was part of a public highway or
even that the adjacent drive strip was part of a public
highway instead of a private driveway. The record is
completely silent on this point. The inference in the
absence of evidence must be to the contrary, for the jury
so held and the Trial Judge fully considered this question when defense counsel argued this point on his motion
for a new trial and submitted his memorandum to the
Court to support this contention.
Section 41-6-8( d) U.C.A. 1953 cited by appellant to
show the spot where plaintiff was standing as part of the
public roadway defines what a Business District is and
does not have anything to do with the question of public
or private roadway. 41-6-S(c) U.C.A. 1953 applies to
marked safety zones such as those set apart in a roadway for passengers to wait for a streetcar or bus and also
does not apply to these facts.
The plaintiff in this action was standing still on a
curbing adjacent to a drive apron and thus 41-6-79 U.C.A.
1953 does not apply. This statute applies only to persons
crossing a roadway. We cannot speculate on whether this
statute might have applied to show negligence had the
plaintiff actually proceeded into the public roadway those facts are simply not .before the Court on this
appeal.

5
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The plaintiff was not standing upon or walking
along a public ro·adway and hence 41-6-82 U.C.A. 1953
cited by appellant as aii act prohibited by law does not
here apply. The statute prohibits ''walking along a;;uJ
upon am adjacen-t roadway.'' There can can be no question on this record that at the time the plaintiff was
struck she was not even w·alking, and was not upon a

roadwa.y.
The a ppellarit in his efforts to pull the respondent
into and upon a public roadway cites statutory definitions
41-6-7 (a), (b), (c) and (d). (See appellant's brief, p. 6)
He argues from a combination of these definitions that
the entire area between the sidewalk and the paved street
is therefore a part of the public roadway. It is obvious
that the area adjoining the spot on which the respondent
stood is a dirt and grass filled area between the sidewalk
and the street curb. Certainly it would lead to a curious
result to hold that a. person standing upon his lawn watering it betw·een a sidewalk and a curb could be struck by
a negligent driver driving out of the street and over
the curb, and be barred from reroYery because he was
by statutory definition upon a public road\vay. Such aresult 'Ya~ never intended by the legislature nor is the statute
amenable to such a construction even by the most strained
construction.
f Il th:e ense before this (~ourt the plaintiff

\\"aS

stand-

ing ou the eurhing adjoining the drive,vay and the de-

fendnnt-appelhult. allowed his car to get out of control,
~\verviug

south into the plaintiff-respondent "Tho had
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every right to stand where she was standing. The fact
argued by appellant that she was considering crossing
the street at a point other than the corner intersection
does not bear upon the issues in this case. The fact is she
had not crossed the street and was not struck in the
course of crossin,g the street, hence her intention is not
material. She might well have changed her mind before
venturing into the street.
It should be noted in concluding the consideration
of this point that there is no evidence in the record to
even show where the ''adjacent property lines'' as defined by 41-6-7 (d) were located and the Court cannot presume without evidence that the spot where plaintiff-respondent stood was not private property adjoining a
private driveway.
It should further be noted that 41-6-7 (c) defines a
roadway as "That portion of highway improved, designed, or ordinarily used for vehicular travel, exclusive
of the berm or shoulder.'' (I tal. supplied) The testimony
is clear and must be taken as true for purposes of this
appeal that plaintiff was not on the portion of the alley
''design-ed or ordinarily used for vehicula.r traffic,'' but
on the contrary she was standing on the shoulder which
was not ordinarily used for vehicular traffic:

'' Q.
A.

Can you all see the picture. You came down
this edge here ?
Yes.

Q. Now is there an area of concrete beyond the
driveway portion?
7
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A.

Yes, there is.

Q. And is that the area you were upon?
A. Yes.

Q. And where was your little niece standingT
A.

She was standing on the curb in the gutter.

Q.

In the gutter. Now could you determine
after the accident whether the car had
backed straight out the alleyway or had
curved?

A.

It had curved.

Q.

And if it haq. proceeded on would it have
stayed on the concrete?

A.

No. It would have been on the dirt.'' (R. 35,
lines 2-16)

'' Q.

Counsel makes somewhat a play on words,
Mrs. Ivie, about what is driveway and what
isn't driveway. There is an area south of
here and north of here that the vehicles do
not drive upon, isn't that true T

A.

Yes, it is.

Q. And were you down beyond the area " . here
the vehicles ordinarily driYe T
A.

Yes.

Q.

That is all."
RECROSS EXAMINATION

''By

Mn.

BERTOCH :

Q.

You say vehicles don't dri Ye on this area, Mrs.
I vieT

A.

Not normally in that area.
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Q.

Well this vehicle drove on it!

A. Yes.
REDIRECT ExAMINATION
''By MR. HYDE:
Q. This vehicle wasn't driving normally was it,
Mrs. Ivie~

A.

No.

''MR. BERTOCH : No further questions.'' ( R.
35, lines 2-22)
Since on appeal from the finding of the lower Court
this testimony must be taken as true, she was not on a
portion of a highway ordinarily used for vehicular travel
and therefore even if there had been evidence in the record that she was on the edge of a public drive, she was
not on the portion ordinarily used by vehicles. Her testimony as to this stands uncontradicted. The case of
B,runette v. Biecke, 72 N.W.(2d) 702 involved a Wisconsin
statute not at all like ours. It defined a highway as
''every way or place of whatever nature open to the use
of the public as a matter of right for the purpose of
vehicular traffic." 88.44( 4) Wisconsin Statutes. (Emphasis supplied) Our statute limits the definition to the
area of the highway ordinarily used for vehicular traffic.
In this case the plaintiff was standing where only an
automobile out of control could have struck her. A person standing on a curb not ordinarily used for vehicular
traffic need not anticipate that a car driven by a driver
who loses control as a result of reaching for his sun
glasses will back into her.
·9
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b) The question of negligence in this case was
a question for the jury.
Whether or not plaintiff kept a proper lookout is
entirely an issue for the jury which the jury in this case
resolved against the defendant.
The plaintiff testified that she looked to see if any
car was coming out of the garage and saw none. (R. 10)
The fact that she looked away and failed to see the car
backing out is not negligence as a matter of law.
In the case of Millay v. Town Taxi Co., 136 N.E. 127,
242 Mass. 314 the facts were similar to the facts in
this case. There the plaintiff was standing not at the
edge but in a public driveway talking to a friend at a
point where the sidewalk crossed the driveway. The defendant backed his cab out of the driveway and struck
the plaintiff. The defendant contended just as in
this case that the plaintiff failed to keep a proper lookout and \\Tas therefore guilty of contributory negligence
as a matter of la\Y. On appeal the Appellate Court said:
''It could not ha Ye been ruled as a matter of
la\\T that the plaintiff "~as rare less .... He also ha.d
a right to assume that tra,~elers by automobile
\vould not "Tithout giving some possible \Yarning,
run him down .... The case u·as properly submitted to the jury and the except-ions 1nust be
orerruled. '· (I tal. supplied) Jlillay v. To,zcn Cab
(~o., 136 N.E. 127, ~42 I\Iass. 314.
In Bou·1nan \". Hut(·hi-nson., 245 N.,\T. 596, 1~4 Neb. 188,
the plaintiff was in an alley \Yashing "Tindows "Then
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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struck. The Court held the plaintiff was not contributorily negligent.
The argument of counsel that a safer route was
available to plaintiff does not make plaintiff negligent
as a matter of law in this case. Had she been struck in
the roadway perhaps this could be argued- a.t least to
a jury. In this case she was standing on the edge of a
concrete curb bordering the driveway. She doubtless
would have been safer in bed but it would be incredible
to contend that as a matter of law since there were
safer places to be that plaintiff was negligent as a matter of law.
In House v. Brandt, 185 Atl. 628, 323, Pac. 52, the
plaintiff was walking past a truck in an alley. The truck
started up and injured plaintiff. The defendant on appeal argued that the plaintiff could have taken a safer
route to his destination. The Appellate Court said:
''A person who uses a street or highway that
is thrown open for public travel, knowing that at
the time there is a safer route which he may take
to reach his destination ... is not necessarily
guilty of negligence because he does not take the
safer route." House v. Brandt, 185 Atl. 628, 323,
Pa. 52.
In a recent well-written case the Michigan court
treated the problem of contributory negligence and set
out the modern trend of decisions. In that case the plaintiff was crossing a public road 250 feet south of an intersection and was not within a crosswalk. He was struck
11
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after he had reached the middle of the road by the defendant. The jury held for the plaintiff and the Trial Judge
granted Judgment N.O.V. on the ground that the plaintiff was negligent as a matter of law. The Supreme Court
reversed the Trial Judge and in doing so said :
"It is not debatable that plaintiff's observations
and/or his deductions therefrom were inadequate
for his protection. If our test for contributory
negligence was whether or not plaintiff had done
all that he conceivably could have done, or even
all that, in retrospect, it is obvious he should have
done for his own safety, no negligence action could
ever be maintained ... This court should not leave
the pedestrian a legal sitting duck." (Ital. supplied) Ware v. Nelson, 88 N.W. 2d 525. (Michigan
1958)
PoiNT

III

NO PREJUDICIAL ERROR WAS COMMITTED
BY THE COURT IN INSTRUCTING THE JURY.

The appellant excepts to the giving of Court's instructions Nos. 4 and 10 on the ground that these instructions
set out conditions upon '\vhich the plaintiff may recover
but do not set out that plaintiff is bound if she is guilty
of contributory negligence. .\II of the Court's instructions must be rPad together as a "~hole to determine if
the jury was adequately instructed.
In instrurtion No. 2 the ('1ourt explained t'\Yire that
~ven

if the plnintiff ''"as other'\\'"ise entitled to recover,
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if contributory negligence was found, she would be
barred from recovery by reason of such negligence.
lnstruction No. 4 must be read together 'vith instruetions 2 and 4(a) which elearly limited 4 to a recovery
only on conditions that no contributory negligence was
found. The Court, if anything, over-emphasized the issue
of contributory negligence by repeating the charge that
plaintiff would be defeated by any negligence on her part
in instructions Nos. 2, 5 and 6.
These instructions are in harmony with the instructions given for the instructing of juries by the Committee for Jury Instruction Forms for Utah. That Committee said at page XVI:
"NO INSTRUCTION STATES ALL THE LAW
In many instances instructions must be given
in connection with others to give an accurate picture of the legal principles involved. .A. notable
example of this is where there is a;n, issue of contributory negligence. It seems needless repetition
to include the proviso 'unless you find against the
plaintiff on the issue of contributory negligence,'
in the various instructions stating the basis upon
which the plaintiff could recover. This should be
kept in mind and instructions given together which
are necessary to supplement each other." J.I.F.U.
Page XVI. (Ital. supplied)
The Trial Judge certainly followed this admonition
to the letter and to avoid needless repetition instructed
separately on the issue of contributory negligence. The
jury was told in instruction No. 2 that if the jury found
contributory negligence they must find for the defendant

13
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and against the plaintiff. Again immediately after 111struction 4 the Court again repeated and admonished the
jury that if the plaintiff did not keep a proper lookout
the jury must find against her. To make this proposition
crystal clear the Court added instruction 5 telling the jury
that if both were "to a degree negligent" the plaintiff
could not recover. It is hard to imagine a more complete
and full explanation of all the circumstances tha.t would
defeat the plaintiff.
The appellant has not seen fit to include in his designation of record the defendant's requested instructions
and they are thus not before the Court on this appeal,
and his contention that the Court committed error in not
granting one of these cannot be considered on appeal.
Dayton v. Free, 148 P. 408, 46 U. 277; Perry Ins. Co. v.
Thomas, 278 P. 535, 74 U. 193.
CONCLUSION
There is no evidence to justify this Court in holding
the plaintiff-respondent negligent as a matter of law.
The injury to the plaintiff 'Yas not the proximate result
of the Yiolation of any statute nor can it be held under
the evidence that she was negligent as a matter of law.
The (-.ourt 's instructions taken as a "Thole correctly
ndYisPd the jury as to the la"T of the case. The verdict
und judgment should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
GOR.DON I. HYDE
Attorney for Plaintiff.
an:d Resp<indent · . · · .. · ·
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